Financial security

Phishing: how to spot fake websites, SMS and emails from a “bank”, a “delivery service” or “Diia”

Phishing is a fake message or website that pretends to be a bank, a delivery service, Diia or another government service so that you enter your card details, password or confirmation code yourself. The main sign: you are sent to a link from an SMS, a messenger or an email and asked for a CVV, PIN, SMS code or a “small payment”. Genuine services never ask for this: open your banking app or the official website yourself, and check government websites by their address on gov.ua.

Illustration for «Phishing: how to spot fake websites, SMS and emails from a “bank”, a “delivery service” or “Diia”»

What phishing is and why people fall for it

The word comes from “fishing”: the fraudster casts bait to thousands of people and waits to see who bites. The bait is a message in the name of someone you trust: a bank, a delivery service, Diia, the tax service, a court, a shop. The message leads to a website that copies the real one, and there the person enters the card number, CVV, banking password or confirmation code themselves. Nobody has to hack the bank's systems for this.

That is why card fraud now rests almost entirely on human trust. According to the NBU, for 2025:

Payment card fraud in Ukraine in 2025 (NBU data)
Indicator2025Change from 2024
Fraudulent transactions with losses256 thousanddown 5%
Total lossesUAH 1.4 billionup 24%
Average loss per transactionUAH 5,536was UAH 4,247, +30%
Average loss per online transactionUAH 6,043was UAH 4,761, +27%
Share of transactions online83%the rest at terminals and ATMs
Share of losses through social engineering90%was 84%

The NBU uses the term social engineering for cases where clients themselves disclose card details, the CVV, confirmation codes, passwords or the internet banking login. Phishing is one of the main ways to obtain these data, together with calls from a “bank security service” and fake “social payments”. There were fewer transactions, yet the average loss grew by almost a third: fraudsters take small sums less often and empty the card completely more often.

What a phishing attack looks like

  1. 1BaitSMS, email or message from the “bank”, “post office”, “Diia”A familiar name and a reason to hurry
  2. 2LinkA site copying the real one down to the detailsOnly the address differs
  3. 3FormCard number, CVV, password, SMS or messenger codeThis is where the theft happens
  4. 4ChargeTransfer from the card, banking login, hijacked messengerOften within minutes
An attack can be stopped at any step, but the easiest is the second: do not open the link from the message.

The bait always plays on one of three emotions. Fear: “your card has been blocked”, “the debt has been passed to an enforcement officer”, “the fine will be doubled”. Gain: “you have been granted a payment”, “tax refund”, “you have won”. Minor hassle: “your parcel could not be delivered, confirm the address”, “pay UAH 18 for storage”. The third group is the most treacherous: the sum is tiny, and people enter their card details without thinking.

Where phishing comes from

Phishing channels and what to watch for
ChannelWhat it looks likeWhat should alarm you
SMS (smishing)A short message with a link, a sender named like “SUDpovistka” or similar to a delivery serviceAny link in an SMS, especially a shortened one; a sender you have never heard from
MessengersA message from “support”, an “operator”, a friend or a group with a logo and a buttonA private message from an “organisation”, a forward from an unknown channel, a request to send a code
EmailAn email with the logo of the tax service, a court or a bank, an attachment or a “Go to your account” buttonA sender address on an unrelated domain, archive attachments, an email you were not expecting
Ads and social mediaA post or ad with a “payment”, a “giveaway” or a “90% discount” and a formA recently created page, disabled or identical comments, payment to a private person's card
QR code (quishing)A sticker on a parking meter, a notice, a letter “from the tax service”The QR code leads to a site that immediately asks for payment or card details; a sticker over another code
Search and marketplacesA fake site in an ad above the search results, a buyer's link “for a safe deal”The address differs from the one you know; a “receive payment” page asks for the CVV

A separate genre is a buyer's link on a classifieds site “to receive the money”. How this scheme works and how to sell safely is covered in the article on OLX and marketplace scams.

Whose names they use: banks, delivery services, Diia and government bodies

The stories change every season, but the same “senders” keep coming back. Below are schemes the cyber police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Tax Service, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, CERT-UA and the Centre for Countering Disinformation have warned about, and what the organisations themselves say.

Typical phishing stories and how the genuine services work
In whose nameWhat they write and ask forHow the genuine service works
Bank“Card blocked”, “suspicious transaction, cancel via the link”, “update your details”. The site copies the banking login and asks for the login, password, card number, CVV and SMS codeA bank does not ask for the CVV, PIN or SMS codes on third-party sites or in messengers. The card status is visible in the banking app that you open yourself
Delivery service“Parcel not delivered”, “confirm the address”, “pay for storage”. The link leads to a payment page asking for card detailsThe cyber police advise checking a parcel only on the service's official website or app. Ukrposhta stresses that it does not write from anonymous numbers or through third-party services, and that no extra payment or card details are needed to receive a parcel
DiiaA site with a Diia-like domain offering to download the “Diia app” through the browser (June 2026); an email “from Diia” about a “tax refund” linking to diia-gov[.]com with a form asking for the CVV (February 2025)According to the Ministry of Digital Transformation, the Diia app is available only in the App Store and Google Play, and the only portal is diia.gov.ua
Government bodies and “payments”“State or international aid” because of power cuts (February 2026): a form asking for the card number, expiry date and CVVMinistry of Internal Affairs: the state never asks for a PIN, passwords or CVV to pay aid, and official government resources end in .gov.ua
Court, finesA “SUDpovistka” SMS with a link to a copy of the e-Court login page asking for the phone number and the code that arrives in TelegramCERT-UA explained that the code gives the attackers access to your messenger
Apple, GoogleA message about a “state-sponsored attack” on your device with a link “for protection”Centre for Countering Disinformation: such warnings come only as system notifications or inside the account, never as an ordinary message or SMS

Fake “payments” from the state, the UN and the Red Cross have been the most common kind of phishing for the past two years. They have their own article on fake aid payments.

How to tell a fake website from the real one

Fraudsters copy the design, logo and texts completely, so look at the address. What matters is the main domain only: the part right before the first single slash after “https://”. Anything to the left of it, separated by dots, can be added by the domain owner at will.

How to read a website address (illustrative examples)
AddressWhose site it really isTrick
diia.gov.ua/servicesThe genuine Diia portalMain domain gov.ua with the service name
diia-gov.comSomeone else's site (this domain was used in phishing in 2025)The word “gov” is there, but the domain ends in .com
diia.gov.ua.vyplata-online.top/...The site vyplata-online.topThe real name sits on the left as a subdomain
mybank-ua.online/loginSomeone else's site, even if the bank is called MyBankThe bank's name plus a hyphen and an unusual domain zone
rnybank.uaSomeone else's site“rn” instead of “m”, the letter “o” replaced with the digit “0” and so on
bit.ly/..., t.me/..., a Google formUnknown until you open itA short link or a third-party service hides the real address

A few checks that take seconds:

  • A government website always ends in .gov.ua. Any gov-ua.com, gov.ua.info, diia-online and the like belong to someone else.
  • The padlock and “https” only mean that the connection to the site is encrypted. Fraudsters get such certificates for free in minutes, so the padlock says nothing about whose site it is.
  • A password manager in the browser or phone works as a detector: on the genuine site it offers your saved login, on a fake it does not, because the address is different. If autofill “for some reason did not work”, stop.
  • Apps should be installed only from the App Store or Google Play, never as a file from a website or a message. A “payment app” or “card protection app” downloaded from a link may read your SMS and control your phone.
  • The website of your bank or a service you use often should be saved in bookmarks; go there only through them or through the app.

What a phishing site asks for and what the fraudster will do with it

Risk by type of data entered
What you enteredWhat a fraudster can doHow urgently to act
Card number, expiry date, CVVPay online with the card, link it to their own wallet or serviceImmediately: block and reissue the card
SMS codeConfirm a payment, a transfer, a banking login or a card linkImmediately: call the bank
Banking login and passwordLog in to banking, transfer money, take out a loan or an instalment planImmediately: change the password, block access through the bank
Telegram, Viber or WhatsApp login codeTake over the account, ask your contacts for money, send new phishing linksWithin minutes: end other sessions, set a password
Email passwordReset passwords to other services via “forgot password”The same day: change the password, turn on two-step verification
Full name, phone, address, document photosPrepare a more convincing call, try to take out a loan in your nameWatch your credit history for several months
An “extra payment” of UAH 18-50 for a parcelThe sum is small, but to “pay” you entered your card detailsAs for a card number with CVV

If the fraudsters got your documents, check whether a loan has been taken out in your name. How to do it for free and what to do if there is already a loan is covered in the article on a loan taken in your name.

How much you can lose: a worked example

A separate online card and limits do not protect against phishing. They cap the damage if a mistake does happen. For comparison: according to the NBU, the average online fraud transaction in 2025 cost the victim UAH 6,043.

Settings worth making once

Protection against phishing: what to set up
What to doWhat it protects against
A separate card for online shopping without a credit limit, topped up before each purchaseLimits the loss to the amount on that card
Limits on online payments and transfers in the banking appA fraudster cannot take more than the limit, even with all the data
Notifications about every transactionYou see a charge as it happens and can block the card at once
Two-step verification (password) in Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp and emailOne SMS code is no longer enough to take over the account
Different passwords for email, banking and social media, a password managerA stolen password for one service will not open others; the manager will not fill in a password on a fake site
Bookmarks for the bank, delivery service, Diia and tax service websitesYou do not look for the address in search, where an ad for a fake may appear higher
System and browser updates, apps only from official storesThe browser warns about known phishing sites; fake “apps” will not install by accident

The faster you act, the better the chance of stopping the charges. The order depends on how far you went.

  1. You only opened the page, entered and downloaded nothing. Close it. The risk is minimal. Take a screenshot of the message with the address and sender, report it in the messenger and block the sender.
  2. You downloaded or installed a file or app. Do not run it; if you already installed it, delete it, disconnect the phone from the network and scan it with antivirus software. Then, from another device, change the banking and email passwords and warn the bank.
  3. You entered card details or an SMS code. Block the card at once in the banking app or by the number on the card or the bank's official website, never by a number from the message. Report fraud to the bank, ask it to record and dispute the transactions, reissue the card.
  4. You entered your banking login and password. Change the password, log out of all devices in the settings, tell the bank and check for new transfers, loans or instalment plans.
  5. You gave away a messenger code. End all other sessions (in Telegram: Settings - Devices), turn on two-step verification with a password and warn your contacts that fraudsters may ask for money in your name.
  6. Go to the police. A cyber police report can be filed at ticket.cyberpolice.gov.ua; in danger or right after a crime, call 102. Keep screenshots of the message, the site address, the sender's number or name, the time and a statement of transactions. The full card number and codes are not needed in the report.

Whether the bank must return the money, who has to prove that you disclosed the data yourself and how to challenge a refusal is covered in the article “Fraudsters stole money from my card: what to do”. In short: the chances are higher if you told the bank immediately and the transactions were confirmed without your code.

Frequently asked questions

How is phishing different from a call from the “bank security service”?

Both belong to the same family of fraud, social engineering. On a call, a person extracts the data by voice; in phishing, it is a fake message and site. They are often combined: first an SMS saying “suspicious transaction”, then a call “from the bank” asking you to read out a code.

The message came from the same number or into the same chat as genuine notifications. Is it definitely the bank?

No. An SMS sender name can be spoofed, and a fake message sometimes lands in the same thread as the real ones. Check the content: a genuine notification does not ask you to follow a link and enter a CVV, PIN or codes.

The site has a padlock and “https”. Is it safe?

The padlock only means an encrypted connection to whatever site you are on. Most phishing sites also use “https”. Only the main domain in the address shows whose site it is.

I entered only the card number, without the CVV or a code. Is there a risk?

The number alone is usually not enough to charge the card online, so the direct risk is small. But the number together with your name and phone helps fraudsters make a convincing call “from the bank”. Stay alert for a few weeks, and if in doubt, reissue the card.

Where can I report a phishing site or mailing?

To the cyber police at ticket.cyberpolice.gov.ua, and to the messenger, social network or email service itself using the “Report” button. If the name of your bank or delivery service was used, forward the message to their official support: they can get the site blocked.

In short

  • Phishing is a fake message and website in the name of a bank, delivery service, Diia or a government body where you enter card details, passwords or codes yourself.
  • According to the NBU, in 2025 social engineering accounted for 90% of card fraud losses, with an average loss of UAH 5,536.
  • Do not open links from messages: open the service's app or website yourself, government sites only on gov.ua, apps only from the App Store and Google Play.
  • Only fraudsters ask for a CVV, PIN, SMS and messenger codes, passwords or an “extra payment” for a parcel.
  • A separate online card, limits, notifications and two-step verification cap the damage if a mistake happens.
  • If you have already entered your details: block the card, tell the bank, change passwords, end other sessions, report to the cyber police.

Sources

  1. Mind.ua citing the NBU - card fraud in 2025: 256 thousand transactions, UAH 1.4 billion in losses (+24%), average loss UAH 5,536, 83% of transactions online, 90% of losses through social engineering (17.04.2026, in Ukrainian)
  2. Dengi.ua citing the NBU - average loss from an online fraud transaction UAH 6,043, 91% of losses online, social engineering 90% versus 84% in 2024 (17.04.2026, in Ukrainian)
  3. Debet-Kredyt - NBU: #ShakhraiGoodbye payment security campaign, 90% of losses through social engineering (16.05.2026, in Ukrainian)
  4. Debet-Kredyt - Ministry of Digital Transformation: a phishing site with a Diia-like domain offered a fake app download; Diia is available only in the App Store and Google Play (08.06.2026, in Ukrainian)
  5. Minfin citing the Ministry of Internal Affairs - fake “government payments” via phishing sites; official government resources end in .gov.ua, the state never asks for a CVV, PIN or passwords (05.02.2026, in Ukrainian)
  6. Holovbukh citing the State Tax Service - fake emails “from Diia” about a tax refund linking to the domain diia-gov[.]com and asking for card details with CVV (03.02.2025, in Ukrainian)
  7. Ministry of Internal Affairs - the cyber police warn about fake parcel SMS sent in the name of a postal service
  8. Komersant Ukrainian - Ukrposhta: the company does not send messages from anonymous numbers or through third-party services, and no extra payment or card details are needed to receive a parcel (11.04.2025)
  9. Ukrinform - CERT-UA: “SUDpovistka” SMS with a phishing copy of the e-Court login that harvested Telegram login codes (03.06.2023, in Ukrainian)
  10. Espreso - Centre for Countering Disinformation: fake messages “from Apple and Google” about a “state-sponsored attack” with a link “for protection” (23.06.2025, in Ukrainian)
  11. Cyber police - report cyber fraud (in Ukrainian)

This article is for information only and is not financial or investment advice. Check current terms with your bank or financial institution before making decisions.

Spotted a mistake or an outdated figure? and we will check it against the primary source and fix it.